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Survival of Rights of Action After Corporate Merger 
A corporation, like a natural person, may sue anyone who 
wrongs it, even its own officers or directors. When the corporate di-
rectors approve such legal action, the suit is deemed "primary."' 
When they do not approve, as might happen if a board member is 
the prospective defendant,2 one or more shareholders may be able to 
sue on behalf of the corporation.3 Such actions, devised by the eq-
uity courts,4 are termed "derivative."5 
Once a corporation ceases to exist, most courts permit neither 
1. The directors' approval is normally needed for primary suits. See United Copper Sec. 
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); 2 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 535 (rev. vol. 1969). 
2. The corporate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders are usually defendants in 
derivative suits, but an eligible shareholder may derivatively sue other parties who have 
wronged the corporation. But see Note, JJemand on JJirectors and Shareholders as a Prerequi-
site to a JJerivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 760 n.82 (1960) (arguing that the derivative suit 
is an improper procedure for claims against third parties). 
3. In some circumstances, courts will not permit derivative suits. For example, if a disin-
terested board of directors, exercising reasonable business judgment, decides not to pursue an 
action, shareholders may not bring it derivatively. See, e.g., Ash v. International Business 
Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. 
Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1957); H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 
§ 147 (rev. ed. 1946). Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (the decision of independent 
directors to terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit is not inconsistent with the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 through -52 (1976)). 
4. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Koster v. (American) Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 
341-44 (1855); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generally 
Prunty, The Shareholders' JJerivative Suit: Notes on its JJerivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 
(1957). 
5. It is important to distinguish between corporate causes of action and personal ( or direct) 
causes of action. When the basis of the suit is a wrong to the corporation, the cause of action is 
corporate; a shareholder may pursue such a claim only through a derivative suit. See, e.g., 
Press v. Marvalan Indus., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1072, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). When the gravamen 
of the action is injury to a shareholder as an individual, he must pursue the action directly, not 
derivatively. See, e.g., Polako.lfv. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Assn., 254 F. Supp. 574, 580 
(D. Del. 1966); 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note I,§ 5911 (rev. vol. 1970). See generally Note, 
JJistinguishing Between JJirect and JJerivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REV, 1147 
(1962). The distinction is difficult to apply; there are " 'borderline cases which are more or less 
troublesome to classify."' Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 
1971) (quoting 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5911). Yet, the distinction is important, even 
for actions under the federal securities laws. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5923.2. A 
table highlighting the differences between derivative and class suits is provided in Kennedy, 
Securities Class and JJerivative Actions in the United States JJistrict Court for the Northern .Dis• 
trict of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. REV. 769, 778-80 (1977). Class suits and 
derivative suits have important tactical differences: 
[A] derivative suit may be essential for rescission. And a derivative suit can have the 
important tactical advantage of relieving plaintiff from the cost of giving notice of pen-
dency, which would fall on him in a class action, but such notice is not required in a 
derivative case. Moreover, a derivative suit does not have requirements like numerosity 
(which may be unattainable when the acquired company was closely held) and predomi• 
nance of common questions over individual questions. Fed. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(l), (b)(3). 
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primary nor derivative suits to be brought in its name. If a merger6 
precipitates that corporate demise, courts usually hold that standing 
to sue, like other assets of the "merged"7 corporation, passes to the 
surviving corporation. This Note ponders the merit of that rule of 
passage. 
Section I categorizes the cases defining the rule of passage. 8 
Some courts have steadfastly adhered to the rule and denied stand-
ing to the merged corporation's shareholders. Other courts, fearing 
that the rule would preclude meritorious actions, have created excep-
tions allowing these shareholders to sue despite the merger. Unfor-
tunately, no court has provided satisfactory criteria for determ.in,!.ng 
Nor does it permit opt outs . . . , which reduce potential recovery and settlement recovery 
and leverage. 
2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD§ 6.5(273)(1) (Supp. 1977). 
6. This Note will not use "merger" in the technical sense of that term; rather, it will use the 
term to describe any transaction that unites two or more corporations into a single surviving 
corporation. Professor Conard has used the term "fusion" to express the same idea. See A. 
CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTNE § 119 (1976). The corporation that operates the 
business after the merger will be called the "surviving corporation" or "survivor." The corpo-
ration that ceases to exist because of the transaction will be called the "merged" corporation. 
Although there are numerous variations, most corporate mergers follow three basic pat-
terns. First, "statutory mergers" or "consolidations" are one-step joinders of two corporations 
into a surviving corporation by operation of state statutory law. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL 
Bus. CORP. ACT§§ 71-72 (1953). Second, in a "share exchange," one corporation trades some 
of its shares for all or most of the shares of the other, which then becomes a subsidiary. The 
parent then votes to merge the subsidiary into itself. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. 
ACT§ 72-A (1953). Third, in a "sale of assets" 'substantially all assets of one corporation are 
exchanged with the survivor for cash, shares, or other property. The former corporation is 
then liquidated, and the cash, shares, or property are distributed to the shareholders of that 
corporation. (Sales of assets are not always followed by liquidation of the seller, but this Note 
will consider only those sales that are.) See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 79 
(1953). See generally A. CONARD, supra, § 119. See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A)-(C) (tax-free 
reorganizations). . 
Some courts attach great significance to the form of the merger. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco 
Elec., Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (Ct. Ch. 1962), a.ffd., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 
(Sup. Ct. 1963). Other courts have been more flexible and have treated transactions that 
amount to a merger as mergers. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406,244 
N.W.2d 873 (1976). In treating the rule of passage some cases draw distinctions based on the 
form of the merger. See, e.g., Massachusetts cases cited in note 16 i,ifra. In general, though, 
the different forms of merger have been, and should be, treated alike with regard to the issue of 
this Note. Compare, e.g., Schlick v. Castle, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (statutory 
merger), with Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D. 2d 116, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964)1 a.ffd., 15 N.Y.2d 
705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965) (sale of assets). Both cases are discussed in notes 
44-45 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
7. Rights of action of the surviving corporation pose no special problem. After the merger, 
the surviving corporation may pursue any claims it had before the merger. See 2 A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 5, § 6.5(273). 
8. Certain cases which do not readily fit any of the three approaches merit mention. In a 
number of cases, the facts raised the issue which this Note treats, but the courts did not resolve 
it. See Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407 (1917); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing 
Co., 489 F.2d 579, 591 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Polakoffv. Delaware 
Steeplechase & Race Assn., 254 F. Supp. 574, 581 (D. Del. 1966); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 41 
F.R.D. 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Another case, Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D.2d SOI, 344 
N.Y.S.2d 457, appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1973), discusses these issues, 
but the reasoning defies explanation. 
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when an exception to the rule of passage is proper.9 
Section II examines the policies supporting the rule of passage 
and proposes criteria for determining when an exception does not 
offend those policies. It suggests that an exception is proper only 
when the defendant is not at arm's length from either the merged 
corporation's management or the surviving corporation. In such ex-
cepted cases, the merged corporation's former shareholders should 
be entitled to sue derivatively and to seek pro rata recovery. 10 
I. CONTOURS OF THE RULE OF PASSAGE 
A. The Rule of Passage, Applied Strictly 
The rule of passage, as applied by a majority of courts, can be 
expressed as follows: After a merger, the merged corporation's rights 
of action vest in the surviving corporation, "which may bring suit 
thereon in its own name, and no right of action remains in the 
[merged] corporation." 11 Courts have proposed three explanations 
for the rule. One is that it merely applies the statutory principle that 
assets of all kinds pass to the surviving corporation. 12 A second ex-
9. The Fifth Circuit termed the problem a "sticky one." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 
489 F.2d 579, 591 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). In 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE~ 23.1.16[1] n.17 (1978), Professor Moore called the question "very difficult." Pro-
fessor Henn remarked that the issue "poses some still unresolved problems." H. HENN, HAND• 
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS§ 361, at 764 (1970). 
A competing view was advanced by Professor Jacobs in The Role of the Securities Exc/1a11ge 
Act Rule JOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 45-46 
(1973): ''The question of the standing of the disappearing corporation is somewhat academic 
because a class action by persons who were stockholders of the disappearing corporation at the 
time of merger can fully redress any fraud perpetrated upon the corporate entity." Even if his 
analysis is limited to the federal securities laws, Professor Jacobs is mistaken in asserting that 
any fraud can be redressed by a class action. If the injury is to the corporation, and not to the 
shareholders as individuals, only a derivative action is permitted. See note 5 supra. Further• 
more, the derivative suit may have substantial advantages for the plaintiff over a class action, 
See note 5 supra. 
10. Damages recovered in derivative suits are normally paid to the corporate treasury. See 
A. CONARD, supra note 6, § 249, at 395; Grenier, Prorata Recovery by Shareholders on Corpo-
rate Causes of Action as a Means of Achieving Corporate Justice, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 
165 (1962). A pro rata recovery, however, directly pays each stockholder a proportionate share 
of what would have been a corporate recovery. See note 55 i'!fra. 
11. 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 1628, at 1390 (1940). Professor Bromberg associates the rule 
that causes of action pass by merger with Delaware law. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 6.5 
(273)(1). See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 366-67 (1972). 
12. For example, in Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 911-12 (9th Cir. 1961), the Ninth 
Circuit construed the Arizona statute to mean that an action against the merged corporation's 
directors would pass by merger to the surviving corporation. Accord, In re Penn Cent. Sec. 
Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 884, 
887-88 (D. Del. 1970); Amstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 916, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 
1937); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519,530, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Ct. Ch. 1964); Berger 
v. General United Group, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Iowa 1978). 
For exemplary statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (Michie 1974); N.Y. Bus. 
CORP. LAW§ 906(b)(2) (McKinney 1963). ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 76(d) (1953) 
provides: 
Such surviving or new corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights, 
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planation, offered by the Eighth Circuit, is that corporate causes of 
action pass by common law as well as statute.13 Finally, in several 
cases involving sales of assets, 14 courts have held that passage of the 
cause of action was a term of the sale agreement. 15 In one case, for 
instance, the court held that where a sale agreement covered "all the 
assets, property, plant and business" of the selling corporation, those 
assets included a cause of action for waste of corporate property. 16 
Whatever the authority for transferring the merged corporation's 
cause of action - statute, common law, or agreement - applying 
the rule of passage also denies the merged corporation's shareholders 
standing to maintain a derivative suit. 17 Courts have given several 
explanations for this result. Some have denied derivative standing 
because the merged corporation, in whose name the shareholders 
sue, no longer owns the cause of action. 18 For example, in Arnstein v. 
privileges, immunities, and franchises, of a public as well as of a private nature, of each of 
the merging or consolidating corporations; and all property, real, personal and mixed, and 
all debts due on whatever account, including subscriptions to shares, and all other choses 
in action, and all and every other interest of or belonging to or due to each of the corpora-
tions so merged or consolidated, shall be taken and deemed to oc transferred to and 
vested in such single corporation without further act or deed; and the title to any real 
estate, or any interest therein, vested in any of such corporations shall not revert or be in 
any way impaired by reason of such merger or consoliclation. 
13. See Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Altes, 511 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1975); Western Auto Sup-
ply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 
(1966). Since corporations are creatures of statute, the court's characterization of the rule of 
passage as one of common law seems anomalous. The court was extending to corporations the 
common law doctrine that tort claims vindicating property rights survive the death of the 
injured person. 
14. Since state merger statutes apply only to formal statutory mergers, the sales agreement 
may control cases where the merger takes the form of a sale of assets. See generally note 6 
supra. 
15. See Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. 69, 161 N.Y.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1916), qffd 
mem., 176 A.D. 945, 162 N.Y.S. 1131 (1917); McMenomy v. Ryden, 286 Minn. 358, 176 
N.W.2d 876 (1970). See generally Note, 45 YALE L.J. 525 (1936). 
16. Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. at 79-80, 161 N.Y.S. at 7. One may profit-
ably compare a line of Massachusetts cases involving sales of assets. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court has held that because one may not assign a cause of action for fraud, such a 
claim does not pass by a sale of all assets. See Baker v. Allen, 292 Mass. 169, 197 N.E. 521 
(1935); American Woolen Co. v. Old Colony Trust Co., 263 Mass. 321, 160 N.E. 816 (1928); 
United Zinc Cos. v. Harwood, 216 Mass. 474, 103 N.E. 1037 (1914). But cf. PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Guardian Indus. Corp., 428 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (rule that personal patent licenses 
are nonassignable does not apply in statutory merger). 
For cases in which the merger agreement explicitly provided that the action would not 
pass, see Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 119,249 N.Y.S.2d 75, 78-79 (1964), qffd mem., 15 
N.Y.2d 705, 205 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965); Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, 109 
N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1951), qffd mem., 279 A.D. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1952), qffd mem., 
304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953). 
17. These shareholders would have standing if they carried over as shareholders of the 
surviving corporation. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 390-91, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357 
(1977). But the suit would be on behalf of the surviving corporation, which, under the rule of 
passage, would succeed to the merged corporation's cause of action. 
18. See Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1961); Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil 
Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 
1978); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 641, 647 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Basch v. 
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Bethlehem Steel Corp., 19 the court reasoned: 
Since whatever right of action the New Jersey corporation had 
against its directors passed to the Delaware corporation, the New 
Jersey corporation after the merger could not have instituted this ac-
tion. Then it follows that if the corporation itself was barred because 
its right of action was transferred to another corporation, the stock-
holders of the New Jersey corporation were without derivative status.20 
Some courts have not even reached the question of who owns the 
claim. They have denied derivative suits because the merged corpo-
ration - the ultimate plaintiff- no longer exists,21 leaving no cor-
poration on whose behalf the shareholders can sue derivatively.22 A 
derivative action might also fail under the "continued ownership" 
doctrine, which requires plaintiffs in derivative suits to own shares in 
the coryoration throughout the litigation.23 Finally, courts have de-
nied standing on the theory that dissenters' rights statutes24 provide 
the exclusive remedy for aggrieved shareholders.25 Thusr strict ap-
Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 
884, 887-88 (D. Del. 1970); Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 334 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Braasch v. 
Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 530, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Ct. Ch. 1964); Berger v. General United 
Group, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 638-39 (Iowa 1978). C.f. Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 
866, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (claims against the survivor pass); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 
246, 249 (Del. 1970) (claims against the survivor pass). 
19. 18 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). 
20. 18 F. Supp. at 918. 
21. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 
(1967) (referring to the "meaninglessness" of a derivative suit on behalf of a merged corpora-
tion); Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978), '!ffd. mem., 603 
F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975); '!ffd., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), revd. on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Katz v. 
Aspinwall, 342 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ala. 1971), '!ffd. per curiam, 459 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972) (a corporation dissolved after a sale of all its assets is legally 
dead); E. FOLK, supra note 11, at 366-67. 
22. State statutes often provide for continued existence of a corporation while it winds up 
its affairs. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261 
(Michie 1974); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 105 (1953). But some courts have held 
such statutes inapplicable where the action may pass by merger. See Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 
F.2d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1961). C.f. Amstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 916, 918 
(E.D.N.Y. 1937) (predecessor of continued-corporate-existence statute). But see text at notes 
32-36 i'!fi-a. 
23. Shareholders may lose their shares in two ways: by surrendering their shares, see 
Voege v. Ackermann, 364 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Independent Investor Protective 
League v. Time, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 391, 393, 412 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (1979), or by electing ap-
praisal, see Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 69 S.E.2d 585 (1952). See generally 1A C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 1826 (1972). 
24. ·See note 108 i'!fi-a and accompanying text. 
25. See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the JJissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Rig/11, 
77 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1964). This argument is inapplicable, however, when the claim is 
based on the federal securities law. See, e.g., Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 
1310, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1976); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 n,3 
(2d Cir. 1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635-36, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 
(1967); 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 6.5(272)(1); note 40 i'!fi-a. "The rights and remedies 
provided by" the federal securities law are "in addition to any and all other rights and reme-
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plication of the rule of passage precludes both primary and deriva-
tive actions in the merged corporation's name. 
Nor can the surviving corporation be certain of its ability to bring 
an action that has passed from the merged corporation. As a pri-
mary suit, the surviving corporation may pursue the action26 unless 
it is itself the defendant.27 For derivative suits, one might suppose 
that, since the surviving corporation can bring a primary action, the 
surviving corporation's shareholders could bring a derivative action. 
But the contemporaneous-ownership rule (not to be confused with 
the continued-ownership rule28) requires that derivative shareholder 
plaintiffs have been shareholders when the wrong occurred.29 
Notwithstanding occasional contrary dicta,30 that rule limits stand-
dies that may exist at law or in equity." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p 
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). 
26. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1034 
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Storer Broadcasting Co. v. Jack the Bellboy, Irie., 107 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. 
Mich. 1952); Bank of United States v. Glickman, 241 A.D. 92,271 N.Y.S. 90, a.ffd. per curiam, 
265 N.Y. 539, 193 N.E. 309 (1934). However, the contemporaneous ownership and vicarious 
incapacity rules arguably present a barrier in some cases. See text at notes 73-77 1i?fra. 
27. Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 96,358, at 93,235 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 
1970); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 530, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Ct. Ch. 1964). These 
courts followed the obvious reasoning that a corporation may not sue itself. 
28. One must be careful to distinguish "continued ownership" from "contemporaneous 
ownership." The former requires that one be a shareholder at the co=encement and through 
the duration of the lawsuit; the latter requires that one have been a shareholder when the 
transaction challenged by the complaint occurred. See Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 999 
(5th Cir. 1978); text at note 23 supra. 
29. At the federal level, this requirement is embodied in FED. R. C1v. P. 23.l, which pro-
vides, in part: "In a derivative action ... , the complaint ... shall allege (1) that the plaintiff 
was a shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his shares 
.•• thereafter devolved on him by operation oflaw .... " This rule originated in Hawes v. 
City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). It was codified in Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix (1882), 
and later in Equity Rule 27,226 U.S. app. at 8 (1912). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
at their inception, adopted it in rule 23(b). Rule 23(b) was reformulated in 1966 as rule 23.1, 
and the drafters retained the contemporaneous-ownership requirement. See 3B MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 23.1.15[1] (1978). 
Most states also follow the requirement. See id. ~ 23.1.15[2] n.6; Harbrecht, The Contempo-
raneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' .Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1978). 
Some courts have reduced the impact of the requirement, however, by applying a "continuing 
wrong" theory. See 7 A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, § 1828, at 346-48; Harbrecht, 
supra at 1052-56. 
30. Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909,913 (9th Cir. 1961); Arnstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
18 F. Supp. 916, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. 69, 80, 161 
N.Y.S. I, 7 (Sup. Ct. 1916), a.ffd., 176 A.D. 945, 162 N.Y.S. 1131 (1917). 
A possible loophole in the rule, not articulated in these cases, is to prove that the shares 
devolved on the plaintiff "by operation of law." FED. R C1v. P. 23.1. See note 29 supra. 
Wright and Miller argue that this language covers "any nonconsensual transaction by which 
plaintiff acquired the stock." 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, § 1828, at 348. 
Even a transfer with "some element of bargain or consent" has been held to qualify under this 
standard if it sufficiently approximates a devolution by operation oflaw. Hirshfield v. Briskin, 
447 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1971). Cf. Helfand v. Gambee, 37 Del. Ch. 51, 136 A.2d 558 (Ct. Ch. 
1957) (where the plaintiff acquired shares in a new corporation pursuant to an antitrust con-
sent decree which she ratified, she acquired them ''by operation oflaw"; the Delaware rule was 
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ing to carryover shareholders of the surviving corporation: those 
who also held shares in the merged corporation when the challenged 
transaction occurred. 31 
B. The Rule of Passage, with Exceptions 
Many courts have found the destruction of opportunities to 
maintain derivative suits unduly harsh. Sensing possible inequities 
in giving corporate managers the power to destroy the derivative 
claims of minority shareholders, they have sought ways around the 
rule of passage. Some have found justifications for giving sharehold-
ers of merged corporations continued standing to maintain deriva-
tive suits. One has given those shareholders a new, direct action. 
But rare indeed is the case that offers standards for determining 
when an exception to the rule of passage is appropriate. 
1. Cases Preserving .Derivative Suits 
Cases allowing shareholders of merged corporations to maintain 
derivative suits have offered three sources of authority: state statutes 
allowing continued corporate existence after a merger, the federal 
securities laws, and general powers of equity. The different tech-
niques merit brief comparison. 
If a corporation is a party to litigation when it is merged out 
of existence, substituting the surviving corporation might disrupt 
the litigation. Thus, most states have statutes permitting litigation 
to continue in the name of the merged party.32 Several courts 
have used these statutes to allow shareholders' suits to continue 
substantially identical to the federal rule). Nevertheless it seems that the "operation of law" 
language is designed principally for inheritances, not for mergers. Compare Phillips v. Brad-
ford, 62 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), with Emporium Capwell Co. v. Anglim, 140 F.2d 
224, 226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944) (transfer of stock in merger was not "by 
operation of law" for tax purposes). See generally Harbrecht, supra note 29, at 1057-60. 
31. Carryover shareholders have even been permitted to pursue an action pending before 
the merger. For example, one Ninth Circuit case refused to allow a derivative action that 
shareholders had initiated before a merger, Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961), but 
a later opinion in the same case permitted shareholders of the surviving corporation to inter• 
vene as parties-plaintiff in the action. DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 
832 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 950 (1964). The court used the principle of relation 
back to avoid operation of the statute of limitations. See generally Albert v. Salzman, 41 
A.D.2d 501, 504, 344 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461, appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1025 
(1973) (intervention permissible in an action that had been dismissed); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 
A.D.2d 116, 121, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (1964), '!ifd., 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 
N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965) (upon merger, substitution of new parties is permissible). See also Mal-
colm v. Cities Serv. Co., 2 F.R.D. 405,407 (D. Del. 1942) (where plaintiff-representative in a 
class action sold her stock, other shareholders were entitled to notice before dismissal and to 
relation back to meet the statute of limitations); Richman v. Felmus, 8 A.D.2d 985, 190 
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1959) (intervention allowed in a derivative suit only for those shareholders with 
contemporaneous ownership). 
32. See note 22 supra. 
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after the merger.33 For example, in Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp. ,34 a derivative action was pending when the corporation 
merged with another. The court relied on former California General 
Corporation Law§ 4116, typical of these statutes, which provided: 
Any action or proceeding pending by or against any constituent corpo-
ration may be prosecuted to judgment, which shall bind the consoli-
dated or the surviving corporation, or the consolidated or surviving 
corporation may be proceeded against or substituted in its place.35 
Emphasizing that the survivor "may" be substituted, the court ruled 
that the pending cause of action need not abate or pass.36 The 
Abrams exception to the rule of passage is quite narrow: it excepts 
only actions commenced before the merger. Moreover, some courts 
have further limited this exception to claims not against the surviv-
ing corporation. 37 
Broader exceptions to the rule of passage are found in cases that 
rely on either the securities laws or general powers of equity. In 
Miller v. Steinbach,38 an example of the cases resting on federal se-
curities law,39 the plaintiff had been a shareholder of the merged cor-
poration. He sued that corporation's officers and directors for 
numerous violations of the federal securities laws. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 17(b) provides that the law of the state of incorpora-
tion determines a corporation's capacity to sue in federal court;40 yet 
the court held that "where an action is based on the federal securities 
33. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978); J.C. Peacock, Inc. v. 
Hasko, 184 Cal. App. 2d 142, 151, 7 Cal. Rptr. 490,495 (1960); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 
I 16, 121, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (1964), qffd., 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 
(1965). q. Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 250 (Del. 1970) (suggesting that the suit 
would have been allowed but for the statute of limitations). 
34. 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
35. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4116 (West 1955), amended and recod!fted, CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ l 107 (West 1977). The court also quoted DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261 (Michie 1974), which 
is to the same effect. 
36. 20 F.R. Serv. 2d at 173. Strangely enough, the Abrams court did not indicate who 
would receive the recovery. 
37. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978); Bokat v. Getty Oil 
Co., 262 A.2d 246 (Del. 1970). 
38. 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
39. Accord, DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969), mod!fted, 
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Continental Tel. Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., [1967-1969 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,J 92,193 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
40. ''The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the Jaw under 
which it was organized." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). A number of courts have, pursuant to this 
rule, used state Jaw in securities cases. See Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978-1979 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,J 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Schlick v. 
Castle, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9, 
Il (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). q. 
Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978) (not mentioning rule 
17(b)), qffd. mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 
726-27 (2d Cir. 1971) (state definition ofa "shareholder" does not control for purposes of rule 
!Ob-5); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 466, 467-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But c.f. 
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. 
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laws, state substantive or procedural laws may not impede the appli-
cation of the federal statute."41 Consequently, the court disregarded 
the rule of passage, allowed the suit to proceed, and endorsed a pro 
rata recovery42 for the shareholders of the merged corporation.43 
Other courts have used their equitable powers to create excep-
tions to the rule of passage. For example, the plaintiffs in Schlick v. 
Castle,44 former shareholders of the merged corporation, sued its 
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966) ("federal and general co=on law" controls). See generally Re-
cent Decision, 21 J. Pua. L. 487 (1972). 
The federal courts need not abide by state rules of standing or capacity in applying a 
federal statute. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), the Court stated that in 
administering the federal securities laws, the courts have a duty to "be alert to provide such 
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." Since federal law is 
supreme, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, such remedies need not conform to state law. See Santa 
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) ("[t]he existence of a particular stale law 
remedy is not dispositive of the question whether Congress meant to provide a similar federal 
remedy .... "); note 25 supra. Cf. Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., (1978-1979 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (derivative antitrust 
claim under federal law). 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has become inclined to read the scope of the securi-
ties laws more narrowly. At one point in the development of federal securities jurisprudence, 
it seemed that the broad scope of those laws would obviate the need for significant reliance on 
the not-as-liberally-applied state-law theories. Professor Loss observed in 1969 that "the im-
plication of a private action under Rule lOb-5 has already displaced and federalized a great 
deal of state law, not only in the area of deceit but also with respect to the duties of officers and 
directors to the corporation and its stockholders." 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3870 
(2d ed. Supp. 1969). 
It is now clear that those laws will not displace the state law of fiduciary obligation. In 
denying a claim that a squeeze-out merger violated rule I0b-5, the Supreme Court held that 
the rule does not amount to a "federal fiduciary principle." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 479 (1977). The Santo Fe ruling will force some plaintiffs who might formerly have 
brought federal-securities-law actions to seek redress under state law. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (state remedies are considered in deciding whether to imply a private right 
of action under a federal statute). 
41. 268 F. Supp. at 268. Cf. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 729 (2d Cir. 1971) (slate 
definition of a "shareholder" does not control for purposes of a derivative action under § IO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 466, 467-68 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (federal law, and not state law, controls standing to bring a derivative suit 
under the federal securities laws). 
42. See note 55 infra. 
43. 268 F. Supp. at 268. The securities laws can also lead to the denial of derivative stand-
ing. Several courts saw no need to protect derivative rights since they found that a class action 
under the federal securities laws would, in those cases, provide adequate protection. See Vine 
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Voege v. Acker-
man, 364 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971). Cf. Independent Investor Protective League v. Time, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 391,412 N.Y.S.2d 
898 (1979) (denying a direct state-law right of action for former shareholders of a merged 
corporation). 
44. 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 249 
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964), qffd, 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965), the court 
refused to apply the rule of passage, observing: 
Policy and equitable considerations weigh heavily in favor of rather than against the con-
clusion that the causes of action against the defendants did not become obliterated by the 
merger of the wronged corporation into another corporation. To hold that a merier 
would have the effect of destroyin~ such causes of action would be tantamount to pavmg 
the way for deliberate corporate pilfering by management and then for the i=umzation 
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former directors and the surviving corporation, asserting violations 
of federal securities laws and state fiduciary obligations. Judge 
Frankel refused to apply the rule of passage to deny the merged cor-
poration's shareholders the opportunity to sue: "It seems incongru-
ous and inequitable that former directors and the surviving corpora-
tion should be immune from suit for fraud in a merger because the 
merged corporation in technical terms no longer exists, when the 
fraud under attack was the very means by which the merged corpo-
ration's existence was ended."45 
2. A Case Creating a .Direct Shareholder Action 
In general, when a corporation has suffered injury, shareholders 
lack standing to sue directly, either as individuals or as a class. They 
must sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation.46 In Kirk v. First 
National Bank,41 a federal district court departed from that rule and 
allowed former shareholders of a merged corporation to sue directly 
on corporate claims. The shareholders of Wright Contracting Com-
pany had sold their shares in response to a tende1 offer by the Hard-
away Company. Subsequently, the former Wright shareholders 
discovered that their ex-president had violated his fiduciary duties. 
The plaintiffs conceded they lacked standing to sue derivatively 
on the corporate claim against the ex-president, and sued directly 
instead. The court recognized that the claim belonged to the corpo-
ration and therefore that the shareholders could normally bring it 
only derivatively. Nevertheless, the court allowed a direct suit be-
of the guilty officers from liability thereby by their arranging for a merger or consolida-
tion of the corporation into or with another corporation. 
21 A.D.2d at 124, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 83. The holding may be explained on other grounds, how-
ever. The merger agreement in Platt contained a clause preserving the right of the plaintiffs to 
bring a derivative suit after consummation of the merger. But see Duffy v. Cross Country 
Indus., Inc., 57 A.D.2d 1063, 1063, 395 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (1977), which cites Platt for the 
proposition that a corporation's action against its officers for self-dealing survives a merger. 
Similar to Platt is Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, 109 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1951), qffd, 279 
A.O. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1952), qffd, 304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953). The court 
allowed a suit in the name of the merged corporation and justified this result by the maxim 
that "Equity looks to substance." One can readily explain the holding, however, by observing 
that the cause of action had been segregated from the corporate assets and assigned to the 
plaintiffs. But cf. Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1961) (following the rule of 
passage despite a clause in the merger agreement that could have been construed otherwise). 
45. 19 F.R. Serv. 2d at 644. See Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967). But cf. Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978) (holding 
that where the merger is not under attack, the "equitable considerations" do not appear), qff d 
mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., (1978-1979 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (since the claim is not 
connected with the merger, equitable considerations do not save the claim). 
Judge Frankel suggested that the plaintiffs receive a pro rata recovery. 19 F.R. Serv. 2d at 
645. See note 55 inji-a. 
46. See note 5 supra. 
47. 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977). 
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cause it found that none of the dangers motivating the requirement 
of a derivative claim were present.48 According to the court, the 
dangers of allowing a direct action are: (1) recovery by a party not 
actually injured; (2) multiple lawsuits; and (3) prejudice to creditors 
and unrepresented shareholders. The court first noted that the plain-
tiffs had actually been harmed: because of the undiscovered breach 
of fiduciary duty, they had not received fair value for their shares. 
Second, no additional lawsuits were possible since all shareholders 
of the Hardaway Company, the surviving corporation, lacked con-
temporaneous ownership.49 Finally, the court determined that an in-
dividual suit would not seriously prejudice corporation creditors or 
unrepresented former shareholders. so 
By allowing a direct suit on a corporate claim, Kirk dramatically 
departs from traditional corporate principles. Even the cases relying 
solely on equitable powers to circumvent the rule of passage have 
heeded the distinction between direct and derivative actions. Kirk 
thus highlights both the frustration courts have felt with the rule of 
passage and their need for a theory that harmonizes the rule's equi-
table exceptions with the related doctrines of corporate law.st 
3. Gabhart and the Quest for Standards 
While each of these justifications for evading the rule of passage 
has allowed courts to achieve intuitively attractive results, none by 
its logic offers a principled explanation of when the exception should 
or should not apply.s2 Criteria are needed for determining when an 
48. 439 F. Supp. at 1149. 
49. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
50. The court reasoned that no prejudice to the creditors would result because the corpora-
tion would not have been able to recover regardless of this suit. As to other former sharehold-
ers, the court argued that any prejudice would be no more serious than that in a typical class 
action. 
51. Independent Investor Protective League v. Time, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 391, 412 N.Y.S.2d 
898 (1979), also merits mention. The court allowed the merged corporation's former share-
holders to initiate a direct action to redress mismanagement that had occurred before the 
merger. The mismanagement claim - unlawful depression of stock value by the directors -
should have been deemed derivative, but unlike Kirk, this court did not describe the claim as 
derivative. 
One inexplicable case allowing an individual claim is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 
F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), mod!fied, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). The court argued that 
"when a corporation becomes non-existent" because of a merger, "the corporate right to sue 
devolves upon the shareholders" of the defunct corporation. 298 F. Supp. at 102. The court 
cited Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), and 
Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 480 (1856), but both are readily distinguishable: In 
Vine, the court allowed a class action since only the Class A shareholders had been injured, 
and Bacon involved not a merger but a dissolution. A true dissolution (as opposed to, e.g., a 
sale of all assets followed by a dissolution in order to effectuate a merger, see note 6 supra) 
requires an altogether different analysis. In a dissolution, the enterprise comes to an end. 
There is no "surviving" enterprise to which the right to sue could pass. Since the authority 
that it cites is not supportive, the statement by the Gerstle court is of dubious validity. 
52. Two recent cases have acknowledged the need for equitable exceptions without sug-
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exception is proper. The Indiana Supreme Court recently addressed 
this problem in Gabhart v. Gabhart.53 The court acknowledged that 
the rule of passage generally controls, but relied on equitable consid-
erations to carve out an exception: 
[A] Court of Equity may grant relief, pro rata, to a former shareholder, 
of a merged corporation, whose equity was adversely affected by the 
fraudulent act of an officer or director and whose means of redress 
otherwise would be cut off by the merger, if there is no shareholder of 
the surviving corporation eligible to maintain a derivative action for 
such wrong and said shareholder had no prior opportunity for redress 
by derivative action against either the merged or the surviving corpora-
tion.54 
Gabhart properly recommended pro rata recovery55 for plaintiffs 
gesting a general standard for finding such exceptions. See Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 
76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978), ajfd mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Evmar Oil Corp. v. 
Getty Oil Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. 
Cal. 1978). 
53. 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977). The Seventh Circuit, required to apply Indiana 
law, had asked the Indiana court for advice. 
54. 267 Ind. at 392, 370 N.E.2d at 358. 
55. The pro rata device allows the shareholders to receive directly their proportionate 
share of what would otherwise be a corporate recovery. The leading case that used the device 
is Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See 
generally Grenier, supra note 10; Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1956). 
Since the merged corporation no longer has a treasury, see note 12 supra and accompany-
ing text, a pro rata recovery is the only damage remedy available in a derivative suit on behalf 
of a merged corporation. Therefore, several cases, like Gabhart, have endorsed the pro rata 
concept in these situations. See Schlick v. Castle, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 
Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Schur v. Salzman, 50 A.D.2d 784, 
784-85, 377 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1975) (memorandum), appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.2d 1007, 348 
N.E.2d 919, 384 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1976). 
Often, recovery is limited to those shareholders who did not participate in the wrongdoing 
as an application of the well-established principle of equity: "He who comes into equity must 
come with clean hands." 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (S. 
Symons ed. 1941). Courts have occasionally used the pro rata device in other contexts to 
effectuate this principle. See Note, supra, at 1316. But see Guerrino v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 423 
F.2d 419,422 (3d Cir. 1970); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 253, 2 A.2d 904, 912-13 
(Sup. Ct. 1938). 
Mere consent to the merger, unlike participation in the wrongdoing, should not bar recov-
ery. The right of action vests in the merged corporation's shareholders because the purchase 
price does not reflect the fair value of the claim. Since those who consent to the merger do not 
receive a premium, their rights should not be subordinate to those_pf the dissenting sharehold-
ers, who are permitted to sue. q: text at notes 108-16 infra (explaining why the opportunity 
for dissent should not limit the right to sue). 
A difficult question is whether shareholders lacking contemporaneous ownership should be 
able to share in the recovery. The best discussion of this issue is Grenier, supra note 10, at 175-
86. 
When former shareholders of merged corporations sue derivatively, it would be logical to 
excuse some of the procedural requirements normally associated with derivative suits. For 
example, many jurisdictions require the plaintiff to make a demand for action: 
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff 
to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if neces-
sary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the 
act10n or for not making the effort. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 23.l. This requirement should be waived. 
The requirement that the plaintiff serve process on the merged corporation to join it as an 
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falling within the exception, but it defined the exception too nar-
rowly. Principally concerned with the derivative suit's deterrent 
function,5~ the court wanted only to guarantee that some party 
would be eligible to bring suit. Accordingly, the exception applies 
only when no shareholder of the surviving corporation can maintain 
the suit derivatively on behalf of the survivor and no shareholder of 
the merged corporation had a prior opportunity to bring the claim. 57 
Yet a derivative suit is more than a deterrent. It also compensates 
wronged shareholders. The next Section develops standards for ex-
ceptions to the rule of passage that reflect both the compensatory and 
deterrent functions of derivative suits. 
II. CRITERIA FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF PASSAGE 
The courts have failed to develop adequate standards for decid-
ing the scope of the rule of passage. Indeed, some courts have not 
even considered that exceptions inay be proper, but instead have ap-
plied the rule of passage mechanically, denying standing to the 
merged corporation's shareholders.58 Those courts may have over-
looked the importance of the derivative actions they were thwarting. 
Derivative suits, a minority shareholder's principal defense against 
majority abuses,59 serve two important policies. First, they compen-
sate the corporation for wrongs suffered,60 giving redress that may be 
an important asset of the corporation.61 Second, they deter miscon-
duct by the corporate management, such as violations of fiduciary 
indispensable party, see, e.g., Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091 (1976), should also be excused. Since the federal courts are to 
apply the indispensable party rule in "equity and good conscience," FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b), 
strict adherence to the joinder and service requirements is not necessary. See Weinert v. Kin-
kel, 296 N.Y. 151, 71 N.E.2d 445 (1947). But see Beals v. Washington Intl., Inc., 386 A.2d 1156 
(Del. Ch. 1978) (denying service of process on a merged corporation). 
56. The court expressed "concern ... that when the cause of action is against directors or 
majority shareholders, the wrongdoers may insulate themselves from liability by means of a 
merger." 267 Ind. at 390,370 N.E.2d at 357. The court did not mention protection of minority 
shareholders' investments as a basis for its exception. 
57. The court based its reasoning on the vicarious incapacity principle, which provides that 
a corporation may not sue on a claim if none of its shareholders are eligible to pursue that 
claim derivatively. See text at note 74 i,!fra. Thus, the court assumed that if none of the 
surviving corporation's shareholders had contemporaneous ownership, the survivor itself 
would be ineligible to sue. But see text at note 77 i,!fra. 
58. See, e.g., Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961). 
59. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5940 (rev. vol. 1970). 
60. Derivative suits are sometimes misused by shareholders who bring specious actions in 
the hope of obtaining a quick and lucrative settlement from the corporate treasury. Such 
"strike suits" naturally harm, rather than compensate, the corporation. See Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541,548 (1949); F. Wooo, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVA• 
TIVE Surrs (1944). 
61. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946). 
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duty.62 
Courts should not apply the rule of passage in disregard of those 
policies. Derivative suits are creations of equity.63 and equitable 
principles should dictate exceptions to the rule of passage when nec-
essary to achieve an equitable result. Unfortunately, the equitable 
result is often hard to ascertain. Standards are needed if judges are 
to reach consistent results and if those affected are to be able to pre-
dict the legal outcome. This Section proposes such standards for ex-
ceptions to the rule of passage. The proposed standards examine the 
relationship between the prospective defendant and those managing 
the merging corporations.64 For claims against parties at arm's 
length from either corporation's management, courts should apply 
the rule of passage. However, if the potential defendant is closely 
associated with the management of both corporations, the action 
should not pass, and the merged corporation's shareholders should 
be permitted to pursue the defendant derivatively. 
A. Claims Against Parties at Arm's Length from the Merged 
Corporation's Management 
The principal justification for the rule of passage is that it en-
forces the intent of the merging corporations. They have presumably 
agreed to pass the action and have ordered their risks and prices 
accordingly.65 One can fairly assume that the parties to a merger 
intend all assets of the merged corporation that are not explicitly 
62. Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Rostow, To 'Whom and For 
'What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN Soc1-
E1Y 48 (E. Mason ed. 1959). Fiduciary breaches and unauthorized actions can often be reme-
died through derivative suits. In Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. 
Rev. 74, 77-78 (1967), Professor Dykstra listed "instances in which shareholders successfully 
challenged or stated good causes of action." These were actions 
for excessive salaries, the issuance of stock for no or insufficient consideration, diversion 
of corporate business opportunity, misapplication of funds, secret profits, excessive stock 
options, violations of contractual arrangements, improper individual claims as opposed to 
corporate claims for surrender [sic] shares, the unlawful purchase by a corporation of its 
own securities, illegal payment for shares in another corporation, sale of control, improvi-
dent loans and the abuse of a subsidiary by the parent. 
Id Shareholders may also bring derivative suits under the federal securities laws. See 13 W. 
FLETCHER, supra note I, § 5923.2 (rev. vol. 1970). 
In some cases, though, indemnity agreements or insurance may undercut the deterrent 
function of derivative suits. See generally w. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
& DIRECTORS§§ 16-17 (1969); G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVE (1963). 
63. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. \ 
64. This Note will use the term "management" to describe those persons who control the 
merged corporation. Officers, directors, and principal shareholders are prime candidates for 
the management. However, a director who has a conflict of interest will not always infect the 
corporation's decisionmaking. See., e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). Control would 
be a factual issue in each case. 
65. Courts have found several sources oflegal authority for the rule. See text at notes 11-
16 supra. This Section discusses equitable concerns that determine when the rule should apply. 
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excepted to pass to the survivor.66 Thus, the parties would negotiate 
over a cause of action like any other asset during price negotia-
tions.67 They would similarly bargain for undiscovered causes of ac-
tion, realizing that latent assets and liabilities may surface after the 
merger. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the surviving corpora-
tion bases its purchase price on an assumption that it can sue on 
later-discovered causes of action. Similarly, in accepting the off er, 
the merged corporation assumes the risk of losing valuable causes of 
action. 68 In this risk allocation, the merged corporation surrenders 
its rights of action to the survivor whether or not such rights are 
apparent at the time of merger.69 
That justification for the rule of passage supports the rule's con-
sistent application - and the corresponding impairment of deriva-
tive standing - when a claim's potential defendant is at arm's length 
from the merged corporation's management.70 In such a case, the 
66. In effect, the surviving corporation purchases the assets of the merged corporation in 
any type of merger, since it surrenders cash, stock, or other property to the merged corporation 
or its shareholders. See generally note 6 supra. If the parties do not intend that all assets pass, 
they may except an asset, such as a cause of action, from the passage. See note 44 supra. 
67. Indeed, some causes of action are so integrally connected with other assets that it 
would be senseless to distinguish them. For example, when the surviving corportion bargains 
to acquire accounts receivable, it is likewise bargaining for the right to enforce those receiv-
ables in litigation. 
68. Some co=entators attack the bargain justification as fictional. See Rosenfeld v. 
Black, 336 F. Supp. 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV, L. REV. 
13,235 n.51. They do so because the notion that the survivor can bargain for latent causes of 
action troubles them. Their objection is answered, though, by viewing the bargain as a risk 
allocation. 
69. A second, though less significant, justification for the rule of passage is that it may be 
more efficient to charge a going concern with prosecuting a lawsuit than to prolong the corpo• 
ration's life for purposes of litigation. The active management of the survivor can probably 
better make the necessary discretionary decisions during the litigation. 
Other justifications for the rule are less forceful. Some have argued that it would be diffi-
cult to locate former shareholders of a publicly held corporation so as to allow them to recover. 
But with computerized records, this obstacle is insignificant. See Rosenfeld v. Black, 336 F. 
Supp. 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 68, at 235 n.51. 
Another argument for passage is that since the plaintiff-corporation no longer exists, it may not 
sue, and, thus, the action should pass to a party able to do so. Such an argument was rejected 
in Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, 936-37, 109 N.Y.S.2d 226, 228-29 (Sup. Ct. 1951), qffd., 279 
A.D. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1952), qffd., 304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953), based on a 
continued-corporate-existence statute. See note 22 supra. But even if such a statute does not 
apply, the argument is weak for its rigid formalism. In light of the possibility of pro rata 
recovery, see note 55 supra, the practical barriers to allowing a suit by a defunct corporation 
can be surmounted. 
70. Arm's-length status would need to be judged on the facts of each case. The term 
"arm's length" has no magical significance here; the essential inquiry is whether the merged 
corporation's management has a personal or financial interest in seeing the litigation resolved 
in favor of the defendant. Alternatively phrased, one might ask whether the management 
exercises independent judgment regarding the merits of the suit and acts on that judgment. 
The problem of defining arm's-length relationships arises in various other legal settings, 
For examples of how Congress has handled it, see I.R.C. § 267 (disallowance of losses, etc. 
between related taxpayers); 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (West Supp. 1979) (definition of"insider" in 
Bankruptcy Act). Cf. note 89 i'!fra (arm's-length concept used in defining "complete fair-
ness"). 
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directors of the merged corporation should adequately represent the 
corporation's interest in the claim. Free from any conflicting motive, 
the management will exact fair consideration from the survivor for 
conveying the action, thus reimbursing the corporation's sharehold-
ers for their loss. 
For example, suppose Mr. Welsh has sold defective equipment, 
under warranty, to M Corporation. Suppose further that the direc-
tors of S Corporation and M Corporation negotiate a merger: Swill 
survive and M's shareholders will receive $100 for each share of M. 
If M's directors are at arm's length from Welsh, then, upon comple-
tion of the merger, the right to bring an action for breach of war-
ranty should pass from M to S. This result is fair, because in paying 
M's shareholders for their stock, S purchases and M sells the right 
to sue Mr. Welsh, just as S purchases and M sells the other assets of 
M. On these facts, the rule of passage sensibly presumes that the 
$100 per share sufficiently compensates M's shareholders for losing 
this right of action, since the disinterested business judgment of M's 
directors is presumptively valid.71 
Although this analysis establishes the general desirability of the 
rule of passage when the merged corporation's management is at 
arm's length from the defendant, two specific situations deserve fur-
ther attention. The first arises when the surviving corporation is the 
defendant. If the cause of action passes in that case, the surviving 
corporation will be unwilling and, indeed, unable to pursue it: a cor-
poration may not sue itself.72 The survivor's only motive for paying 
fair value for the claim would be to settle it. If the parties are at 
arm's length it makes good sense to assume that they do in fact nego-
tiate a settlement. 
A second special problem arises in some mergers due to the 
vicarious incapacity principle, which states that a corporation may 
not sue if none of its shareholders is eligible to bring a derivative 
suit. The principle originated in Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Bar-
ber,73 where Dean Roscoe Pound, then a commissioner of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, argued that if the stockholders "have no 
standing in equity to entitle them to the relief sought for their bene-
fit, they cannot obtain such relief through the corporation or in its 
own name. . . . It would be a reproach to the courts of equity if this 
71. "[T]he law will not hold directors liable for honest errors, for mistakes of judgment, 
when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith . . . . And that is true even though the 
errors may be so gross that they demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the 
corporate affairs." 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039, at 37-38 (rev. vol. 1975). See Chelf 
v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 505-07, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
72. See note 27 supra. 
73. 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). 
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were not so."74 At least one court has applied this principle to hold 
that if none of a corporation's stockholders meets the contemporane-
ous-ownership requirement,75 the corporation itself may not sue.76 
But when a merger involves no carryover shareholders, applica-
tion of the contemporaneous-ownership and vicarious incapacity 
rules seems to subvert the rule of passage by passing the action to a 
party unable to bring it. Returning to the previous example, suppose 
that M Corporation, which has a right of action against Welsh, sells 
all its assets (including rights of action) to S Corporation. If none of 
M's shareholders carries over as a shareholder of S, so that none of 
S's shareholders satisfies the contemporaneous-ownership require-
ment, Welsh might argue that the vicarious incapacity principle bars 
the suit by S. Yet such an application of vicarious incapacity would 
be improper, since it would not advance the purpose of the contem-
poraneous-ownership requirement: to avoid unjustly enriching par-
ties who suffered no harm.77 When a merger conveys causes of 
action, the negotiated price reflects any anticipated recovery, and no 
unjust enrichment occurs. 
B. Claims Against Parties Within Arm's Length of the Merged 
Corporation's Management 
Directors, officers, and principal shareholders are liable to their 
corporation for breaches of fiduciary duty. When such breaches oc-
cur, innocent shareholders may sue derivatively to recover damages 
for the corporation. The guilty parties certainly should not be able 
to use their authority or influence in the corporation to compromise 
such rights of action and escape personal liability.78 
Nevertheless, a merger may present an opportunity for the 
merged corporation's management to insulate itself or some close as-
sociate79 from liability.80 If a right of action against the merged cor-
74. 67 Neb. at 664-65, 93 N.W. at 1032. Accord, Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 
Md. 523, 535, 100 A. 645, 650 (Ct. App. 1917). 
15. See text at note 29 supra. 
76. Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 A.D. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1950), qffd., 
302 N.Y. 840, 100 N.E.2d 37 (1951). 
77. The requirement does have other purposes. Most notably, it has been used to combat 
strike suits and collusive efforts to acquire diversity of citizenship. The irrelevance of those 
purposes to mergers is demonstrated in Note, Corporate Incapacity to Sue Where Stocklio/ders 
Would Be Barred from Suing .Derivatively- TIie Vicarious Incapacity Exception, 54 B.U, L. 
REV. 355, 374-77 (1974). The Note concludes that "it is not necessary to mechanically apply 
the vicarious incapacity rule; it is feasible for a court to apply the rule only when the purpose 
of preventing unjust enrichment is actually advanced." Id. at 377. 
78. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 6019, at 509 (rev. vol. 1970). 
79. Although this Subsection's textual discussion is limited to the most egregious situation 
- where the merged corporation's management is itself the defendant - the analysis extends 
easily to all situations where the defendant is not at arm's length from the merged corpora-
tion's management. See note 70 supra. 
80. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 390-91, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357 (1977). 
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poration's management passes to the surviving corporation, a new 
party will have responsibility for pursuing the claim to judgment. 
The guilty management may find the surviving corporation a more 
agreeable adversary than its own shareholders: if the survivor has a 
close relationship with the management, it may hesitate to pursue 
the action vigorously. 
Allowing the guilty management to insulate itself from liability . 
through a merger undermines both purposes of derivative suits: de-
terrence of misconduct and compensation for injury.81 For example, 
suppose that Clytemnestra is the chairman of the board and majority 
shareholder of Mu Corporation, and she has profited by appropriat-
ing a corporate opportunity. Minority shareholder Agamemnon is a 
potential plaintiff in a derivative action against Clytemnestra requir-
ing her to account to the corporation for her profits. While Aga-
memnon journeys to the courthouse to file a suit, Clytemnestra sells 
all of Mu Corporation's assets to Sigma Corporation, which is con-
trolled by her housemate, Aegisthus. Immediately after the sale, Mu 
Corporation is liquidated.82 If the cause of action against Clytem-
nestra passes to Sigma Corporation by this merger, 83 Clytemnestra 
will escape liability and Agamemnon will probably not be compen-
sated. 84 
These circumstances pose a classic case for an exception to the 
rule of passage.85 The example suggests that reference to the law of 
:fiduciaries' conflicts of interest may aid in defining such an excep-
tion. Courts usually defer to the business judgment of corporate of-
ficers and directors. 86 But when those :fiduciaries have adverse 
interests, such as personal contracts with the corporation, 87 their 
business judgment on that matter is presumed invalid. 88 
While courts have applied various standards in analyzing conflict 
of interest transactions, the modem trend is to judge them by a 
"complete fairness" test.89 For example, in Hirslyield v. Briskin,90 
81. See text at notes 59-62 supra. 
82. Agamemnon was excusably delayed on his way to the courthouse. See generally AES-
CHYLUS, AGAMEMNON in 1 GREEK TRAGEDIES I (R. Lattimore trans. 1960). Compare E. 
O'NEILL, MOURNING BECOMES ELECTRA (1931). 
83. See note 6 supra. 
84. The possibility that appraisal would provide adequate compensation is discussed in the 
text at notes 108-16 in.fro. 
85. The example is couched in terms of a cause of action that predates the merger. The 
analysis that follows, however, applies equally well when the cause of action arises out of the 
merger. 
86. See note 71 supra. 
81. See Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1948). 
88. See 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note I, § 921 (rev. vol. 1975). Such conflicts render the 
transaction voidable by the corporation. See id § 913. 
89. See H. HENN, supra note 9, § 238, at 467. Professor Henn characterizes the modem 
fairness test as follows: "Would an independent corporate fiduciary in an arm's length bargain 
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the controlling stockholders of Briskin Corporation approved a cor-
porate loan to another corporation that they personally controlled. 
Upon default, the minority shareholder of Briskin sued the control-
ling stockholders derivatively for breach of fiduciary duty. Since the 
defendants' personal interests conflicted with their fiduciary duties, 
the court imposed liability for damages "unless defendants succeed 
in 'overcoming the presumption against the validity of the transac-
tion by showing its fairness.' "91 
When the management or a close associate is the potential de-
fendant in an action by a merged corporation, the management has a 
similar conflict of interest. As corporate officers, they seek recovery; 
as individuals, they seek immunity. Because the management's 
judgment on a merger might be tainted by this conflict, courts should 
determine whether passage of the action to the surviving corporation 
treats the shareholders with complete fairness. If not, the action 
should not pass. 
Complete fairness turns on whether the merged corporation sells 
its right of action to the survivor for a fair price.92 Unfortunately, 
direct determination of the price's fairness is speculative and cum-
bersome.- Parties to mergers do not specify how much is paid for 
causes of action, and courts have no simple way to calculate that 
aniount.93 Furthermore, it would be unwieldy to review the fairness 
of the entire merger any time such a right of action were involved.94 
Yet the complete fairness test need not be cast aside. A court can 
estimate the fairness of the purchase price by examining the relation-
ship between the potential defendant and the surviving corporation. 
One can expect the survivor to bring legitimate claims that it ac-
quires, as long as it is at arm's length from the defendant.95 And if the 
survivor is apt to bring the action, the parties to the merger will ne-
gotiate a fair price for that asset.96 Therefore, a court can presume 
bind his corporation to such a transaction?" Id Formerly, transactions were voidable by vir-
tue of the conflict alone, or the conflict plus fraud or bad faith. Id § 238, at 466-67. 
90. 447 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1971). 
91. 447 F.2d at 697 (quoting Schlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 280-
81, 166 N.E.2d 793, 800 (1960)). 
92. See Co=ent, Going Private - Juggling Shareholder Protection with Corporate Flexi-
bility: Will the States J)rop the Ball?, 1978 W1s. L. REV. 797, 807. 
93. Even if such an allocation were possible, causes of action are notoriously difficult to 
value. And the problem is particularly acute when the valuation is not of a particular cause of 
action, but of a latent cause of action. See generally text at note 68 supra. 
94. Such a view would undermine the business judgment rule. See note 71 supra. A 
shareholder would thereby be able to force a review of the fairness of any merger by bringing a 
suit, however specious, against the directors of the merged corporation. 
95. Note that this test - whether the survivor is at arm's length from the defendant -
differs from the one presented earlier - whether the merged corporation's management is at 
arm's length from the defendant. See note 70 supra. 
96. This assumption merits brief elaboration. One might think that the manager-defend-
ant in the merged corporation would agree not to extract fair value from the survivor, in 
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that the survivor paid fair value for claims against parties at arm's 
length. On the other hand, the survivor will not sue parties with 
whom it has a close relationship and accordingly will not pay fair 
value for claims against such parties.97 In those cases, the merged 
corporation's shareholders will not be compensated for their loss. 
Illustratively, reconsider the hypothetical in which Clytemnestra 
appropriated Mu Corporation's opportunity.98 Recall that Aegis-
thus, who controls the surviving Sigma Corporation, is the house-
mate of Clytemnestra, who controls the merged Mu Corporation. 
Since Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are not at arm's length, Sigma 
Corporation - controlled by Aegisthus - is unlikely ever to sue 
Clytemnestra for the wrongful appropriation. Thus, Sigma Corpora-
tion has no reason to pay fair value for the claim,99 and the liquida-
tion payment to Agamemnon (a minority shareholder of the merged 
corporation) will not include fair consideration for his surrender of 
the cause of action. 100 Agamemnon will only be compensated if he 
may pursue his claim despite the merger. 
To summarize briefly, when the prospective defendant is not at 
arm's length from the merged corporation's management, that man-
agement faces a conflict of interest. The outcome of such merger 
cases should be determined, as in other conflict-of-interest cases, by 
the standard of complete fairness. But a conventional approach to 
complete fairness - direct evidence of the adequacy of the purchase 
price - is cumbersome. Instead, courts should gauge fairness by 
looking to the relationship between the prospective defendant and 
the surviving corporation. If those parties are at arm's length, the 
court should presume101 that complete fairness has been achieved 
and should apply the rule of passage. If they are not at arm's length, 
the court should create an exception to the rule of passage and let the 
exchange for a promise not to sue. Certainly, from the survivor's standpoint, this would be 
equivalent to paying fair value for the right to sue and then receiving that amount back in 
settlement of the suit. Yet the survivor would be receiving the settlement money not from the 
defendant but from the shareholders, a clearly unacceptable result. 
The answer to this analysis is that the survivor's promise not to sue would be unenforceable 
in a court of law. Since the promise could be made only in a transaction designed to defraud 
the merged corporation's shareholders, it is clearly against public policy. And once the prom-
ise is unenforceable, it is unlikely that the merged corporation's management would pay very 
much for it to someone who is at arm's length. 
97. Cf. text at note 72 supra (claims against the survivor). 
98. See text at notes 82-84 supra. 
99. One could theorize that Aegisthus, via Sigma Corporation, has settled the claim with 
Agamemnon. As a practical matter, however, Agamemnon would probably not even be repre-
sented in the merger negotiations, so it is specious to say that Agamemnon has consented to a 
settlement. 
100. Commentators have recognized that in situations of this type, the offered price is 
probably inadequate. Bradney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Take-
overs, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297,298 (1974); Comment, supra note 92, at 807. 
IOI. Because of the problems involved with allowing other types of proof, see notes 93 & 
94 supra and accompanying text, this presumption should be conclusive, not rebuttable. 
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shareholders of the merged corporation sue derivatively for dam-
ages.102 
C. Inadequate Alternatives to the Exception 
Some courts have argued that alternative shareholder remedies 
render exceptions to the rule of passage unnecessary. 103 They have 
pointed first to the possibility of direct attack on the merger. Non-
consenting104 shareholders may be able to bring a direct suit against 
an illegal merger, seeking damages or injunctive relief. 105 Fraud, 
bad faith, and lack of authority are well accepted as sufficient 
grounds for illegality. 106 But suits based on illegality offer share-
holders insufficient protection: a merger that causes hardship to 
some shareholders may nonetheless be legal. 107 Thus, the opportu-
nity for direct attack may be no opportunity at all. 
Nor should the second alternative remedy, appraisal, preclude an 
exception to the rule of passage. Nearly all jurisdictions have dis-
senters' rights statutes authorizing shareholders who dissent from a 
merger to demand that the surviving corporation purchase their 
shares at fair market value, as determined by an appraiser. 108 In 
theory, those statutes fully protect minority shareholders, since the 
102. Recovery would be on a pro rata basis. See note 55 supra. 
103. See, e.g., Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 392, 370 N.E.2d 345, 358 (1977) (excep• 
tion unavailable if shareholder had a "prior opportunity for redress"). 
104. In general, a corporation may not merge without the approval by vote of at least a 
majority of its shareholders. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note I, § 7063 (rev. vol. 1973). Unless 
there is fraud, shareholders who have voted in favor of the merger may not question its valid-
ity. Id § 7146. 
The opportunity to vote on a merger is not itself sufficient to protect each shareholder's 
investments. A controlling group could force an unfavorable agreement on the minority 
shareholder. Dissenters' rights statutes, designed to remedy this problem, are discussed in the 
text at notes 108-16 infra. 
105. See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 7157 (suit allowed), 7158 (injunctive remedy), 
& 7162.1 (damage remedy) (rev. vol. 1973). 
106. Id § 7160. Though some courts have considered these shareholder suits to be deriva-
tive, see, e.g., Lieferant v. Bartell, 36 Misc. 2d 477, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the 
better view treats them as personal rights. See Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 
267 (2d Cir. 1971); H. BALLANTINE, supra note 3, § 143, at 336-37; 15 w. FLETCHER, supra 
note 1, § 7158 (rev. vol. 1973); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE t 23.1.16(1], at 23.1-48 (1976). 
Treating such a claim as derivative would raise the very problem this Note addresses. 
107. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 392, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357-58 (1977). For 
example, a merger may improve the company's profitability and thus have a legitimate motive, 
even though its e!f ect is to squeeze out shareholders at an unfair price. 
108. F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS§ 5.27, at 326. See, e.g., 
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT§ 80 (1953), which provides, in part: 
Any shareholder of a corporation shall have the right to dissent from any of the following 
corporate actions: 
(a) Any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a party; or 
(b) Any sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the 
corporation not made in the usual and regular course of its business, including a sale in. 
dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to an order of a court having jurisdiction in 
the premises or a sale for cash on terms requiring that all or substantially all of the net 
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appraiser is expected to weigh every item of value, including corpo-
rate causes of action, in deciding the worth of the dissenter's stock.109 
Consequently, some courts have held appraisal to be the exclusive 
post-merger remedy for minority shareholders.110 
To see the error in that approach, one must recognize that ap-
praisal is not an exclusive remedy in other contexts. Courts have 
consistently denied the exclusivity of appraisal when a federal secur-
ities claim is involved. 111 And even for state law claims, the law on 
the strictness of the exclusivity is inconsistent. One court com-
mented: 
[T]here is no agreement among the authorities. . . . Some authorities 
appear to say that the statutory remedy of appraisal is exclusive. . . . 
Others say that it may be disregarded and that equity may intervene if 
the minority is treated oppressively or unfairly, . . . or if the merger is 
tainted with fraud or illegality.112 
But even if a state's law does make appraisal an exclusive rem-
edy, a court should not construe it to mandate universal application 
of the rule of passage. First, causes of action are particularly hard to 
value, since recovery is speculative. 113 Second, legislatures enacted 
appraisal statutes principally to elµninate injunctive suits that may 
delay the mergers; 114 allowing the merged corporation's shareholders 
proceeds of sale be distributed to the shareholders in accordance with their respective 
interests within one year after the date of sale. 
(c) Any plan of exchange to which the corporation is a party as the corporation the 
shares of which are to be acquired. 
Section 81 of the Act outlines the procedure involved in electing the appraisal remedy. 
109. See Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 216 F. 242,244 (D. Mont. 1914), qjfd. sub 
nom. Wall v. Parrot -Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407 (1917); In re Willcox v. Stem, 18 
N.Y.2d 195, 204, 219 N.E.2d 401, 405, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 45 (1966); Tabulating Card Co. v. 
Leidesdorf, 17 Misc. 2d 573, 574, 188 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
ll0. See, e.g., Loeb v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 829, 830 (Del. Ch. 1971); Beloffv. 
Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949) (under a state statute now super-
seded, the court held the remedy to be exclusive even though it recognized that the appraisal 
did not in fact include the value of the cause of action). q: Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D.2d 501, 
505, 344 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461-62, appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1973) (rem-
edy of accounting for gain received by the survivor is unavailable due to availability of ap-
praisal). But cf. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-l 13(b) (1975) (appraisal remedy is "[i]n addition to any 
other right he (the shareholder) may have in law or equity"). 
111. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
112. Bove v. Co=unity Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 53, 249 A.2d 89, 98-99 (1969). Professor 
O'Neal has observed that the issue is "far from settled." F. O'NEAL, supra note 108, § 5.29, at 
340. Compare Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 
1965) (appraisal is not exclusive when the defendant has engaged in fraud), and Ramsburg v. 
American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333, 340 (7th Cir. 1956) (election of dissenters' remedy did not 
involve forfeiture of shareholder status, nor did it foreclose shareholders from suing to enjoin a 
merger), with the cases cited in note 110 supra. 
113. Accountants, recognizing the difficulty of such valuations, often relegate discussions 
of litigation to the footnotes of financial statements. See generally 3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS (CCH) §§ 4311.33 to .39, 4311-1 (FASB Statement No. 5, Appendix A and Inter-
pretation No. 14). See also F. O'NEAL, supra note 108, § 2.16. 
114. At one time, unanimous consent of shareholders was required for merger. As corpo-
rations grew larger, this restriction seriously hindered mergers. To remedy the problem states 
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a pro rata action for damages does not cause such a delay. Third, 
even if appraisal adequately compensates the shareholders, the rule 
of passage can destroy much of the derivative suit's deterrent value 
because the surviving corporation, not the defendant, bears the 
cost. us Finally, some commentators have challenged the efficacy of 
appraisal in any context.116 In sum, neither appraisals nor direct at-
tacks obviate the need for an exception to the rule of passage. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have struggled with the rule of passage. Though they 
have often reached just results, no court has developed a fair and 
generalized standard for determining when the rule should and 
should not be applied. This Note has proposed such a standard. To 
decide whether a particular claim should pass by merger, one must 
answer two questions: (1) Does the merged corporation's manage-
ment deal at arm's length with the prospective defendant? and (2) 
Does the surviving corporation deal at arm's length with the pro-
spective defendant? If the answer to either question is "yes," the 
claim should pass to the surviving corporation. If the answer to both 
questions is "no," the action should not pass. Instead, the former 
shareholders of the merged corporation should be entitled to sue for 
damages in a derivative suit. 
eliminated the unanimity requirement; but, at the same time, they created dissenters' rights. 
See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 381, 370 N.E.2d 34S, 3S2 (1977); Levy, Rights of l}is-
senting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 420-21 (1930). 
I IS. See generally note 62 supra and accompanying text. 
116. Dean Manning has argued that in seeking appraisal, the only things of which a share-
holder can be certain are "the uncertainty, the delay, and the expense." Manning, The Share-
holder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 233 (1962). Professor 
O'Neal has objected that the procedure is expensive, that technicalities are apt to foreclose the 
dissenter's remedy, that the delay in receiving fair market value is costly, and that the tax laws 
discourage use of the procedure. F. O'NEAL, supra note 108, § 5.28. Though a number of 
commentators follow Manning and O'Neal in criticizing dissenters' rights statutes, others have 
defended the appraisal remedy. Compare Bradney & Chirelstein, supra note 100, at 304-07 
(criticizing the remedy) with Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in 
Modem Corporate .Decisionmaking, 51 CALIF. L. REV. I, 71-86 (1969) (defending the remedy), 
Professor Eisenberg argued that the criticisms of appraisal "indicate not that the remedy is 
unsound, but merely that its usefulness, like the usefulness of all legal rights, may be limited by 
the boundaries of reality and legislative drafting." Id at 73. 
